Have the Rwandan Troops Left?

So remember when this was supposed to be a big step forward? Congo and Rwanda would stop arming each other's enemy militia, Rwanda would neutralize Nkunda, and Congo would allow Rwanda into the Kivus to eliminate the FDLR threat. Then Congo would throw a big party for Rwandan troops as they marched back to Rwanda, mission accomplished. And remember how a few of us grumps (AdF, GP, and yours truly) said, WTF?, even as the UN, the US, and several media outlets draped hosannas on the arrangement? And then remember when the Congo actually held that party, and Rwandan troops actually marched back home, and Alan Doss and Joseph Kabila said, "Thanks, guys, we'll take it from here?"

Turns out, not so much. More and more evidence emerging that many of the Rwandan troops may not have left, after all. More and more allegations that Rwanda's installed a new set of Banyarwanda overlords in North Kivu. More and more proof that Congolese have finally said Ilunga! and begun to challenge Kabila's authority. We'll see how this turns out, but I get the feeling that this is one story that has only just begun.

So what happens next? Could Kabila's government fall? Could the mai-mai become the scourge of the newly adopted CNDP, now wearing Congolese army uniforms? Who will protect the real interests of the BanyaRwanda, or adjudicate between their interests and those of the autochtones? How and when will the FDLR re-establish themselves--and who will protect the Congolese from them when they do? When will unequivocal evidence emerge that Rwandan troops have remained behind? And why is Doss so eager to go along with this whole charade?

My recommendation, as it's been for a while, is to declare the Kivus a UN Protectorate, to establish military control over the entire region and operate the mines in accordance with some minimal set of labor laws (eg., you got to be 16 to work them, you get paid a decent wage regularly), to sell the minerals at an open auction, and to distribute the money earned to local social providers and/or directly to the local population. Gradually, over a period of time (say three years), to relinquish these powers to nascent indigenous military and political institutions, which in the meantime we will have been busy building up. Yes, this requires that we commit far more resources to the region than we have to date. But these are not problems we can help solve on the cheap.

Slow Movement on Obama's Africa Agenda

Reed Kramer has an excellent review at AllAfrica.com on the personnel filling out Obama's Africa team. I came away more hopeful than I had been. The bottom line: while Africa may not be today's priority, Obama is putting together an effective crew who in due time may make some serious policy changes in how the US deals with the continent. I was particularly interested to learn that the Obama transition team had compiled a lengthy dossier, authored by prominent U.S. and African experts, "of 23 thematic and country-specific papers, looking at energy, governance, peacekeeping and women, as well as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Angola, Uganda and the Mano River states (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, plus Cote d'Ivoire)." I'd be interested in seeing the Great Lakes section, or at least in learning who authored it.

That said, I still worry that Obama will have neither the resources nor the political capital to make significant changes in US policy towards Africa, given the scale of the domestic crises that confront him. For example, a number of the most effective things Obama could do for the continent would require that he take on entrenched domestic constituencies, for example on banking, on food aid, and on agricultural subsidies and textiles. For another, I worry that much of his policy may come to be predicated--if only by default--on a belief in the magical powers of US diplomats. The notion that a sprinkling of special envoys--the main policy prescription of a leading advocacy group with close links to the new administration--can bring a resolution to the complex emergencies in Darfur, the Great Lakes, Zimbabwe and elsewhere seems . . . a little optimistic. The Onion's featured a few good pieces over the years satirizing America's messianic complex towards Africa. Unless the Special Envoys come equipped with the kind of checkbooks and military might that back up Ross, Mitchell, and Holbrooke, there's no reason to believe they'll be any more effective than Houser or Merlin Olsen. And on the Great Lakes, in particular, I worry that many of the same people who presided over the catatstrophic policies of the Clinton era are back in the saddle, and still none the wiser about what drives the conflict, or how truly ambiguous the characters they once saw as "the good guys" really are.

They're Gone

BBC has the pictures to prove it.



Now what?

Number of Times Obama Mentioned Africa in his State of the Union Speech:

Zero.

Ross's Plans Contradicted by Internal MONUC Memo

Reuters reports that it has seen an internal UN memorandum that underlines just how unrealistic Alan Doss's plans for the Kivus are. At a press conference on Saturday, Doss indicated that the Congolese army was preparing to launch a second wave of strikes against the FDLR in South Kivu, while MONUC forces maintained control over the areas already seized by the joint Rwandan-Congolese operation in North Kivu.

The memo indicates that at least one person at MONUC knows what most sentient people have known for a long time: namely, that the FARDC are completely incompetent, and MONUC woefully inadequate, to accomplish either of these missions.

From Reuters:

The pullout [of Rwandan forces] has prompted fears within the United Nations' biggest peacekeeping force that the mainly Hutu Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebels, who have mostly avoided clashes with the joint force, will seek revenge.

"The planned pullout of (Rwandan) troops raises concerns about the protection of the civilian population, given the limited capacity and professionalism of (Congolese) troops," read an internal U.N. memorandum, which was seen by Reuters.

"Although the FDLR has mostly vacated the areas upon the arrival of the joint forces, it is likely that they are waiting in the bush for the forces to retreat and then come back to retaliate on civilians perceived as being traitors," it said.

Le Phare: Rwandan Troops Posing as CNDP to Infiltrate FARDC

Le Phare says that Rwandan troops are infiltrating FARDC under the guise of being ex-CNDP militia seeking to integrate into the national army.

Meanwhile, according to Bloomberg, Alan Doss says that the Congolese army is set to launch a second wave of strikes against the FDLR in South Kivu, while MONUC forces maintain control over the areas already seized by the joint Rwandan-Congolese operation in North Kivu. He wouldn't deny or confirm whether Rwandan troops would be involved, but a Rwandan army spokesman said they would not be.

Curiouser and curiouser. Why would Doss believe FARDC capable of launching an effective counter-insurgency operation against the FDLR? Why would he believe MONUC capable of holding territory the Rwandan army briefly seized by scaring off the FDLR? Given that neither force has ever demonstrated anything like the capacity needed for these missions, why embark on them now--unless you had some reason to believe that they've suddenly gotten substantially more competent?

But soyons raisonnable. The idea that the UN would conspire with Rwanda to keep its soldiers in eastern Congo to help maintain the peace strikes me as ludicrous. First, they wouldn't do that, and second, they couldn't possibly keep something like that a secret.

So once again, I'm just baffled.

The Christmas Day Massacre--Video

Reuters has an excellent video on the Christmas Day massacres at Faraje.

That Didn't Take Long

From BBC:

Hutu militias have re-occupied areas in the Democratic Republic of Congo despite the recent offensive against them, UN officials say.

Fighters of the FDLR group were driven from their bases by a joint force of Congolese and Rwandan troops.

But United Nations refugee agency officials say the FDLR has returned, as Rwanda starts to withdraw its troops.

From Bloomberg:

Rwandan rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo attacked civilians and forced thousands to flee their homes, the United Nations said, a day before the two nations are expected to announce a successful end to a joint hunt for the insurgents.

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, killed and raped civilians in several villages in North Kivu province, ”sparking a new wave of displacement” since Feb. 13, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said today in an emailed statement.

From Radio Okapi:

For his part, the president of civil society in North Kivu worries that the FDLR will only increase their activities after the Rwandan troops retreat. Jason Luneno says, "The FDLR have not returned to Rwanda. Their combat forces were dispersed into the interior of the province. And we worry that the acts of revenge they have already started to commit against our population will only get worse."

De son côté, le président de la société civile du Nord-Kivu craint que l’activisme des FDLR ne s’accentue avec ce retrait des troupes rwandaises. Jason Luneno se plaint : « Les FDLR ne sont pas partis au Rwanda. Les forces combattantes ont été dispersées à l’intérieur de la province. Et nous craignons que les exactions qu’ils ont déjà commencé à commettre sur nos populations, ne puissent s’aggraver. »

Meanwhile, back at the Ranch

Jeune Afrique is reporting that food is becoming increasingly scarce in northeastern Congo in the aftermath of the LRA's sweep through the region. An official in Dungu says the region has become completely unsafe and that people there are unable to tend their fields.

And Bloomberg reports that Australian mining giant BHP Billiton has stopped exploring for copper in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s southern Katanga province after five years. In December, BHP withdrew from two diamond exploration joint ventures in Congo. This decision constitutes a real vote of no-confidence in the global economy or the Congolese government, and probably both.

That Guy who Resigned Speaks

Remember General Vicente Díaz de Villegas, that Spanish guy who was force commander for MONUC for about 24 hours last year? He just gave a lengthy interview to a Spanish newspaper about why he resigned. Unhelpfully, the interview is in Spanish. From what I can understand, he resigned because he was being micromanaged from New York and put in charge of a force totally inadequate to the mission(s) he was being told to undertake. What triggered his resignation was the command to conduct a "cordon and search" operation against Nkunda, a command he felt unable to accomplish on either a strategic or tactical basis. Nkunda's forces were quite capable, unlike the Congolese military; he had little effective intelligence capacity; and his Benneton forces, comprised of leftover soldiers from dozens of nations, was perpetually reinventing the wheel, as staff came and went.

I guess we knew most of this, but what's interesting is the heat he was getting in late October to take out Nkunda. Why him? Why, of all the nasty little militia in the Kivus, was the UN suddenly so interested in neutralizing Nkunda's forces? Could it be that they were getting a sense that Nkunda was about to cause Rwanda all kinds of diplomatic problems, once the Experts Report came out? Or am I just being bunco?